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Abstract 
 The security of web-based services is currently playing a vital role 
for the software industry. In recent years, many technologies and standards 
have emerged in order to handle the security issues related to web services. 
This paper shows techniques to enhance the security of web services, and 
some of the recent challenges and recommendations of a proposed model to 
secure web services.  It shows the security process of a real life web 
application, which includes; HTML5 forms, login security, and a single sign-
on solution. This paper also aim to discuss the ten (10) most common web 
security vulnerabilities and how to prevent the web application from three 
(3) of the vulnerabilities. Amongst them are; SQL Injection, Cross Site 
Scripting and Broken Authentication, and Session Management.  
 
 Keywords: Security, External Attack, Vulnerability  
 
Introduction 
 The world wide web is largely based on Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP), which specifies the format of message exchanged by a client 
known, in this case, as the user agent and the server. However, the request 
format which is most familiar to internet users is what is commonly called 
the Uniform Resource Locator (URL). When a user enters a URL into the 
browser window, the browser first checks the scheme of the URL to 
determine the protocol. Terms like web application, website, web-based 
system, web-based software, or simply web may have the same meaning. 
The web is indispensable in modern commerce, entertainment, and social 
interaction. It is a complex delivery platform for sophisticated distributed 
applications with multifaceted security requirements.  
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 However, most web browsers, servers, network protocols, browser 
extensions, and their security mechanisms were designed without analytical 
foundations. In complicating matters further, the web continues to evolve 
with new browser features, protocols, and standards which were added at a 
rapid pace. The specifications of new features are often complex, lack clear 
threat models, and involves unstated and unverified assumptions about other 
components of the web. As a result, new features can introduce new 
vulnerabilities and break security invariants assumed by web applications.  
 In this paper, we take the first step towards building a comprehensive 
formal foundation for web security. Also, we discuss the common web 
security vulnerabilities and how to prevent the web application from the first 
three vulnerabilities, and then implementing those vulnerabilities in real life 
web application. 
 Consequently, there is a large number of work on formally verifying 
security properties of network protocols, web security including model 
checking using a variety of tools (Mitchell et al., 1997), and constraint-based 
methods (Millen & Shmatikov, 2001). Based on the study of SQL Injection 
Attacks and Countermeasures (Sayyed Mohammad et al., 2013), this paper 
gives scientific categorization of strategies to avert and recognize SQLIA. 
We characterize web application vulnerabilities and how they may bring 
about SQLIA. At a point, we show an order of SQLIA in view of its 
weakness. Sonoda et al. (2016), in their paper, show the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation in Stochastic Model of SQL Injection Attacks. In the 
paper titled “SQL Injection Detection and Prevention using Pattern Matching 
Algorithm”, they try to use Pattern Matching Algorithm to detect and prevent 
SQLI attacks on websites, hence providing maximum security to websites 
(Kharche et al., 2015).  
 Gupta et al. (2016) in their paper show a context-sensitive 
sanitization based on XSS defensive framework for the cloud environment. It 
discovers all the hidden injection points in HTML5-based web applications 
deployed on the platforms of cloud. Furthermore, it sanitizes the XSS attack 
payloads injected in such points in a context-sensitive manner.  
 The Organization of this Paper: The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows:  
 The Common Models section represents the existing models and 
related reference papers.  
 The Most Common Vulnerabilities section shows the ten common 
vulnerabilities.  
 The Implementation section implements our proposed model. 
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Common Models 
 There are many threats associated with web browsing, web 
applications and web security. They include phishing, drive-by downloads, 
blog spam, account takeover, and click fraud. Although some of these threats 
revolve around exploiting implementation vulnerabilities such as memory 
safety errors in browsers or tricking the user. Our focus in this paper is on the 
ways in which an attacker can abuse web functionality that exists by design. 
For example, an HTML form element allows a malicious website generate 
GET and POST requests to arbitrary web sites, leading to security risks like 
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). Websites use a number of different 
strategies to defend themselves against CSRF (Barth et al., 2008). However, 
we lack a scientifically rigorous methodology for studying these defenses. 
By formulating an accurate model of the web, we can evaluate the security of 
these defenses and determine how they interact with extensions to the web 
platform. 
 The core idea in our model is to describe what could occur if a user 
navigates the web and visits sites in ways the web was designed to be used. 
For example, the user could choose to type any web address into the address 
bar and visit any site, or click on a link provided by one site to visit another. 
Since browsers support the “back” button, returning the user to a previously 
visited page, many sites in effect allow a user to click on all of the links 
presented on a page, and not just one. When the user visits a site, the site 
could serve a page with any number of characteristics, possibly setting a 
cookie, or redirecting the user to another site. The set of events that could 
occur, therefore, includes; browser requests, responses, cookies, redirects, 
and so on, transmitted over HTTP or HTTPS. Therefore, we believe that 
examining a set of possible events accurately captures the way web security 
mechanisms are designed. For example, the web is designed to allow a user 
to visit a good site in one window and a potentially malicious site in another. 
Since the back button is so popular, web security mechanisms are usually 
designed to be secure even if the user returns to a previously visited page and 
progresses differently the second (or third or fourth) time. 
 
The Most Common Vulnerabilities 
 There is a paper in which there are Tracing known as security 
vulnerabilities in software repositories, and it uses a Semantic Web-enabled 
modeling approach (Alqahtani et al., 2016). Thus, the common 
vulnerabilities which we got in real applications are: 
 i) SQL Injection: Injection is a security vulnerability that allows an 
attacker to alter back-end SQL statements by manipulating the user supplied 
data. Injection occurs when the user input is sent to an interpreter as part of a 
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command or query to trick the interpreter into executing unintended 
commands and gives access to unauthorized data. 
 The SQL command which when executed by web application can 
also expose the back-end database.  
 ii) Cross Site Scripting: Cross Site Scripting is shortly known as 
XSS. XSS vulnerabilities target scripts embedded in a page that are executed 
on the client side i.e. user browser rather then at the server side. These flaws 
can occur when the application takes untrusted data and send it to the web 
browser without proper validation. Attackers can use XSS to execute 
malicious scripts on the users in the case of victim browsers. Since the 
browser cannot know if the script is trustworthy or not, the script will be 
executed, and the attacker can hijack session cookies, deface websites, or 
redirect the user to unwanted and malicious websites. XSS is an attack which 
allows the attacker to execute the scripts on the victim's browser. 
 iii) Broken Authentication and Session Management: The 
websites usually create a session cookie and session ID for each valid 
session, and these cookies contain sensitive data like username, password, 
etc. When the session is ended either by logout or the browser closed 
abruptly, these cookies should be invalidated i.e. for each session, there 
should be a new cookie. 
 If the cookies are not invalidated, the sensitive data will exist in the 
system. For example, for a user using a public computer (Cyber Cafe), the 
cookies of the vulnerable site sits on the system and is exposed to an 
attacker. When an attacker uses the same public computer, the sensitive data 
would be compromised after some time. 
 In the same manner, a user using a public computer, instead of 
logging off, he closes the browser abruptly. When an attacker uses the same 
system, when browsing the same vulnerable site, the previous session of the 
victim will open up. Then, the attacker can do whatever he wants to do like 
stealing profile information, credit card information, etc. 
 iv) Insecure Direct Object References: It occurs when a developer 
exposes a reference to an internal implementation object, such as a file, 
directory, or database key as in URL or as a FORM parameter. The attacker 
can use this information to access other objects and can create a future attack 
to access the unauthorized data. 
 v) Cross Site Request Forgery: Cross Site Request Forgery is a 
forged request from the cross site. CSRF attack is an attack that occurs when 
a malicious website, email, or program causes a user's browser to perform an 
unwanted action on a trusted site for which the user is currently 
authenticated. A CSRF attack forces a logged-on victim's browser to send a 
forged HTTP request, including the victim's session cookie and any other 
automatically included authentication information, to a vulnerable web 
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application. A link will be sent by the attacker to the victim. When the user 
clicks on the URL when logged into the original website, the data will be 
stolen from the website. 
 vi) Security Misconfiguration: Security Configuration must be 
defined and deployed for the application, frameworks, application server, 
web server, database server, and platform. If these are not properly 
configured, an attacker can have unauthorized access to sensitive data or 
functionality. Sometimes, such flaws result in complete system compromise. 
Keeping the software up to date is also a form of good security. 
 vii) Insecure Cryptographic Storage: Insecure Cryptographic 
storage is a common vulnerability which exists when sensitive data is not 
stored securely. The user's credentials, profile information, health details, 
credit card information, etc. comes under sensitive data information on a 
website. These data will be stored on the application database. When these 
data are stored improperly by not using encryption or hashing*, it will be 
vulnerable to the attackers. (*Hashing is transformation of the string 
characters into shorter strings of fixed length or a key. To decrypt the string, 
the algorithm used to form the key should be available) 
 viii) Failure to Restrict URL Access: Web applications check URL 
access rights before rendering protected links and buttons. Thus, applications 
need to perform similar access control checks each time these pages are 
accessed. In most of the applications, the privileged pages, locations, and 
resources are not presented to the privileged users. By an intelligent guess, 
an attacker can access privilege pages, access sensitive pages, invoke 
functions, and view confidential information (Shinde et al., 2016). 
 ix) Insufficient Transport Layer Protection: This deals with 
information exchange between the user (client) and the server (application). 
Applications frequently transmit sensitive information like authentication 
details, credit card information, and session tokens over a network. By using 
weak algorithms or using expired or invalid certificates or not, using SSL 
can allow the communication to be exposed to untrusted users. This may 
result to  the compromise of a web application and/or the stealing of 
sensitive information (Duncan et al., 2016). 
 x) Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards: The web application uses 
few methods to redirect and forward users to other pages for an intended 
purpose. If there is no proper validation while redirecting to other pages, 
attackers can make use of this and can redirect victims to phishing or 
malware sites, or use forwards to access unauthorized pages. 
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Implementation of the Proposed Model 
 In this section, we described our proposed model and showed the first 
three common vulnerabilities effect and how to protect them. Here, we will 
cover the SQL Injection, Cross Site Scripting, and Broken Authentication 
and Session Management.  
 i) SQL Injection Attacks 
 SQL injection attacks are caused by an unexpected user input for the 
developer of the web application (Shinde et al., 2016). The method of attack 
is very simple, but the power of SQL injection attacks is very strong. 
However, it causes a serious social problem. Now, we will give an example 
of SQL injection attack. Assume that there exists a web application that has 
the following login authentication program as stated below: 
 SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=’userID’ AND pw=’pass’ 
 From the above example, if malicious user input ’ OR 1=1-- into the 
form of id, then the following SQL sentence is constructed by the web 
application. 
 SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=’’ OR 1=1--’ AND pw=’pass’ 
1 = 1 is always true and the string -- deauthorizes the following strings. 
’ AND pw=’pass’ 
 Therefore, if this attack were successful, then malicious user can gain 
unauthorized access to the database of the web application. 
 In our proposed model, we tried the following SQL injection queries. 
 Executed SQL query when username is userID and password is a 
single quote: 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name=userID and password=''' 
 Executed SQL query when username is userID and password is ' or 
'1'='1: 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='userID' and password='' or '1'='1' 
Table 1. The Cheat Sheet for checking the SQL Injection in our model 
username password SQL Query 
userID userID SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='userID' 
and password='userID' 
 
userID ' or '1'='1 
 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='userID' 
and password='' or '1'='1' 
 
userID ' or 1='1 
 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='userID' 
and password='' or 1='1' 
 
userID 1' or 1=1 -- 
- 
 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='userID' 
and password='' or 1=1-- -' 
 
' or '1'='1 
 
' or '1'='1 
 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='' or '1'='1'  
and password='' or '1'='1' 
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' or ' 1=1 
 
' or ' 1=1 
 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='' or ' 1=1'  
and password='' or ' 1=1' 
 
1' or 1=1 
-- - 
blah 
 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='1' or 1=1 - -' and 
password='blah' 
 
 
 Furthermore, we used the SQL Queries from the Table 1 Cheat Sheet 
on our proposed model architecture, and finally prevented the SQL injection. 
We have seen few SQL injection-preventing algorithm. Also, we found that 
our proposed architecture is the simple and easiest to implement in the web 
application. In Figure 1, we show the proposed model architecture for SQL 
injection. Here, we used three input text fields for login to the database. We 
used an auto-generated Captcha, which prevents our web application from 
the robotic request. In SQL query generation section, we placed all the 
queries from our cheat sheet and then checked the coding level condition. 
Finally, we are trying to match the condition on Matching query section. 
After putting all the SQL queries, we put whitelisting in our HTML text 
Field. Even though the query is successful, we still put whitelisting in our 
HTML text Field. The most important thing in our evaluation is that we do 
not show any error or success message anywhere in the Web Application.   
 
Figure 1. The proposed model architecture for SQL injection 
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 ii) Cross Site Scripting: Cross Site Scripting is shortly known as 
XSS. XSS vulnerabilities target scripts embedded in a page that is executed 
on the client side i.e. user browser rather than at the server side. These flaws 
can occur when the application takes untrusted data and send it to the web 
browser without proper validation. Attackers can use XSS to execute 
malicious scripts on the users in the case of victim browsers. Since the 
browser cannot know if the script is trustworthy or not, the script will be 
executed. Also, the attacker can hijack session cookies, deface web sites, or 
redirect the user to unwanted and malicious websites. XSS is an attack which 
allows the attacker to execute the scripts on the victim's browser. 
 In 2016, Shashank Gupta and B.B.Gupta conducted a survey on the 
various journals on “Cross Site Scripting attacks and Defense mechanism” 
(Shashank Gupta et al., 2016). They analyzed the major concerns for web 
applications and Internet-based services which are persistent in several web 
applications. They highlighted some of the serious vulnerabilities found in 
the modern web applications. Below is our Proposed Architecture for Cross 
Site Scripting: 
 
Figure 2. The proposed model architecture for Cross Site Scripting 
 
 For an attack to happen, the attacker tries to find the user input areas. 
The user input is given such priority because it is the only way for the user or 
client to interact with the server. If the attacker can be successful in injecting 
the malicious code into the server, an attack is guaranteed to happen. In order 
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to prevent the attacker to have that privilege, we sanitize the user input. As 
shown in Figure 2, we initially considered the user input. If the user input 
contains any HTML-specific tags like “<i>, <br>, <a> etc..", we sanitize the 
request and store it in the database. If the user input contains any special 
symbols which are generally used in script functions, they should be 
sanitized. If the user input contains any script tags which are one of the most 
important ways an attack is made possible, they should be properly sanitized. 
If the user input contains any styling related code, then the code should be 
filtered and stored in the database. Finally, we have restricted the redirection 
of a specific web application page to some other page through which we can 
stop most of the attacks. This can be done by sanitizing the user input if it 
contains any window location or document refferer methods. If the above 
methods are not followed, the attacker tries to steal the valuable information 
of the users like cookies. Usually, if we consider any login page, example 
sessions will be created for every user. The flaw in any browser is that it 
stores the session id in the form of a cookie. So, if the attacker steals this 
cookie, he can enter into the web application as an authorized user and the 
results can be more devastating. 
 iii) Broken Authentication and Session Management: The 
websites usually create a session cookie and session ID for each valid 
session, and these cookies contain sensitive data like username, password, 
etc. When the session is ended either by logout or the browser closed 
abruptly, these cookies should be invalidated i.e. for each session, there 
should be a new cookie. 
 If the cookies are not invalidated, the sensitive data will exist in the 
system. 
 A check should be done to find the strength of the authentication and 
session management. Keys, session tokens, and cookies should be 
implemented properly without compromising passwords. 
 
Vulnerable Objects 
•  Session IDs exposed on URL can lead to session fixation attack. 
•  Session IDs same, before, and after logout and login. 
•  Session Timeouts are not implemented correctly. 
•  Application is assigning same session ID for each new session. 
• Authenticated parts of the application are protected using SSL, and 
passwords are stored in hashed or encrypted format. 
•  The session can be reused by a low privileged user. 
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Implications 
 • By making use of this vulnerability, an attacker can hijack a 
session, and gain unauthorized access to the system which allows disclosure 
and modification of unauthorized information.  
 • The sessions can be highjacked using stolen cookies or sessions 
using XSS. 
 
Proposed Model Architecture for Broken Authentication and Session 
Management 
 In this section, we focus on previously known session vulnerability. 
Also, we proposed the architecture which is shown in Figure 3, and our 
implementing login page shown in Figure 4. When any user or attacker tries 
to login into the admin page, they will need to put a username, password, and 
an auto-generated captcha. 
 
Figure 3. The proposed model architecture for Session Management 
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Figure 4. The login page of our implementing website 
 
 If all the fields matches with the database, then they can login or 
show the admin page. Now there are two options to hijacking the session; 
One is the logout or logoff section and another is the browser back and 
forward button section. Here, we made the most important security. We also 
made a fake.php page and linked it to our admin home page. If anyone can 
try the browser forward and the back button, then he can see the fake.php 
page. Actually, we placed there a condition which checks the value of the 
username and password. If anyone of these is empty, then it automatically 
shows the fake page with Object not found! and Error 404. 
 On the other section logoff option, we made an awesome security. If 
we tried to log out, we will have to execute the following code: 
<?php 
error_reporting(0); 
session_start(); 
session_unset();  
session_destroy();  
?> 
 The session_unset() function frees all session variables currently 
registered, and the session_destroy() destroys all of the data associated with 
the current session. It does not unset any of the global variables associated 
with the session, or unset the session cookie. To use the session variables 
again, session_start() has to be called. Through this way, we can prevent our 
web application from Session hijacking. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this paper, we tried to focus on the most common vulnerabilities of 
recent time. Also, we proposed individual prevention architecture for 'SQL 
Injection', 'Cross Site Scripting', and 'Broken Authentication and Session 
Management'. On the other hand, by implementing our proposed models, we 
have successfully prevented a real life website from those external attacks. 
Finally, it can be concluded that we have partially enhanced the web security 
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against recent external attacks. Of course, our implemented model does not 
capture the entire web platform and web security concerns. 
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